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Introduction
In many countries it has been observed that the supply of labor seems to depend on business cycle fluctuations. That is, it is commonly believed that the labor supply is higher when the labor market is tight than when it is slack, where slackness is represented by the unemployment rate. One popular explanation of this phenomenon is that during a recession, workers become discouraged and give up searching for work. Economists view this as the result of workers believing that their chances of finding a job are so low that the implied monetary and psychological costs of searching yield a utility of searching that is lower than the utility of being out of the labor force (as perceived by the worker).
An additional source of business cycle variation in labor supply may be variations in individual wage rates.
The observation that the labor supply seems to vary according to the business cycle has given rise to the "discouraged worker" concept. A discouraged worker is one who is not searching for work under the current business cycle conditions, but otherwise would have been searching if the chances of obtaining an acceptable job were sufficiently high. Although the discouraged worker concept has been around for a long time (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1988) , there are surprisingly few studies based on microdata that address this issue within a structural framework.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze married or cohabiting women's decisions on labor force participation and employment in a way that explicitly accommodates the discouraged worker effect within a structural setting. In particular, we wish to establish behavioral relations that enable us to analyze the effect on labor supply behavior as a result of changes in the probability of obtaining a suitable job. Our point of departure is a simple search model that is used as a theoretical rationale to motivate the structure of the utility of looking for work. From this theoretical characterization, an empirical model is developed and represented by the probabilities of not participating in the labor force, working, and being unemployed, respectively. Our approach enables us to characterize these probabilities in terms of market wage rates, demographic factors, nonlabor income, and the probability that an acceptable job offer is available given that the woman searches for work.
Empirical micro studies that analyze the effect of unemployment on labor supply include Ham (1986) , Meghir (1987, 1998) , Connolly (1997) , and Başlevent and Onaran (2003) . Bloemen (2005) estimates an empirical job search model with endogenously determined search intensity. The paper that is closest in spirit to our work is Meghir (1998), henceforth BHM (1998) . However, our analysis departs from BHM (1998) in several aspects. First, whereas they analyze labor force participation, employment, and hours of work, we analyze only employment and labor force participation. Thus, in one aspect, our modeling assumptions are weaker than in BHM (1998) because we do not specify an hours of work relation. Because we do not address the supply of hours of work relation, we are unable to distinguish between concepts such as the fixed cost of working and search costs. This is in contrast to BHM (1998) , who address this issue. Second, we extend earlier search theoretic approaches by showing how one can conveniently allow for nonpecuniary job attributes in our formulation. This is an important extension. Remember that in the standard search theoretic formulation one cannot identify the arrival rate of job offers and the distribution of wages of the incoming job offers without additional strong functional form assumptions (Flinn and Heckman, 1982, pp. 121−125) , unless one has data on actual job offers. In our context, where jobs are characterized by both wages and non-pecuniary attributes the value of arriving job offers is unobservable, and the researcher thus faces an additional challenge when specifying empirical structural relations. In our paper we show that our assumptions imply an interesting and useful explicit functional form characterization of the utility of being unemployed as a function of the search cost, the arrival rate of acceptable job offers, and the utility of being employed. This is the main theoretical contribution of our paper and it yields a characterization that is particularly useful for motivating the specification of the empirical model. Finally, we propose a particular version of Heckman's method of correcting for selectivity bias in the estimation of the wage equation that applies when participation in the labor force is modeled by a logit model (cf. Heckman, 1979) .
Our approach also differs from the one employed by Bloemen (2005) in that we base our empirical model on simpler assumptions about the agent's knowledge and ability to account for future uncertain events (job arrivals and layoffs). However, in another sense our approach is more general in that it is consistent with a setting in which the agent accounts for non-pecuniary aspects of the jobs.
The empirical model is estimated on a sample of independent cross-sections of married and cohabiting women in Norway, for each quarter from the second quarter of 1988 to the fourth quarter of 2008. 1 The reason why we focus on married women is that this subgroup of persons is most responsive to market incentives. As regards the discouraged worker effect, we find that, on average, about one third of the married women outside the labor force are discouraged.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the theoretical framework is developed and the general structure of the choice model is obtained. In Section 3, the discouraged worker effect is 1 To simplify the verbal exposition, we refer to both these types of females as married in the rest of the paper. defined formally within our structural setting and in Section 4 the empirical version of the model is specified. Section 5 contains a description of the data, and the estimation procedure and estimation results are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 reports elasticities and simulation results, including selected elasticities for different population groups as well as for all women in different periods.
The model
In this section, we build on a simple theoretical framework that subsequently will enable us to formulate an empirical model for individuals' labor supply behavior as a function of the probability of obtaining an acceptable job. Specifically, we shall apply search theory to obtain a characterization of the option value of being unemployed. Note that an agent who decides to search for work may have to stay unemployed for some time before an acceptable job offer arrives. This requires that the agent is able to evaluate the utility of the respective job offers and to judge whether or not they are acceptable.
Consider now what happens when an unemployed agent is searching for a job. The agent is viewed as being uncertain about her opportunities in the labor market and about the utility of arriving job offers.
Jobs are characterized by (real) wages and non-pecuniary attributes. Job offers have utilities that are i.i.d., and job offers arrive according to a Bernoulli process at discrete time epochs. This means that at most one offer arrives at each time epoch. From the agent's point of view the randomness is due to future uncertain job-specific wages and non-pecuniary attributes. Examples of non-pecuniary aspects are; job-specific tasks to be performed, job-specific fixed hours of work, location of the job, and quality of the social and physical environment of the job. The notion of non-pecuniary attributes is similar to Lancaster's characteristic approach, see Lancaster (1971) . The uncertainty about job attributes is assumed to be revealed upon inspection once a job offer has been received. Thus this setting is different from the typical job matching models such as those used by Jovanovic (1979) where it is assumed that there is an unknown match quality that is revealed gradually to the firm and to the worker after the job has been accepted. The job arrival rate and the distribution of the random component of the utility function are assumed known by the agent. At a given point in time, the agent behaves as if future job arrival rates and the distribution of the utilities of potential jobs do not change (stationary case). However, the agent may in each period revise her perception about the job arrival rate and the distribution of the random component of the utility of the job offers. In general, we view the assumption of stationary search environment as a more realistic assumption than a non-stationary setting since the agent hardly has much information about future changes in real wages and the distribution of job types. Thus, the best she can do is to make utility evaluations based on the assumption that the current situation will prevail for some time. However, in the typical situation where unemployment benefits have a limited duration, known by the agent, the stationarity assumption is clearly restrictive and unrealistic. Unfortunately, without the stationary assumption the model will be rather complicated and intractable for empirical analysis. Moreover, the agent is also assumed bounded rational in the sense that she ignores the possibility of changing job or being laid off in the future when evaluating the value of search. This, of course, does not mean that she will never consider changing job in the future. It simply means that she is unable to (or does not care) to account for the uncertainty with respect to future job loss when evaluating the current value of search. Also, for the same reason, we assume that when the agent is out of the labor force, she receives no job offers.
Let λ be the probability of a job offer arrival at a given time and let V denote value of search.
Following Lippman and McCall (1976) , 2 it follows readily that 
(2) is quite intuitive. When the optimal policy is determined by (2) one may interpret 2 U as the lump sum value of the job offer over the infinite horizon. The expected interval between two job arrivals is equal to 1/λ. Consequently, c/λ is the expected search cost until a job arrives. Thus, V is equal to the expectation of the maximum of the utility of working and the utility of searching minus the expected cost of searching until a job arrives.
Although the relation in (2) is of theoretical interest it is not directly applicable for empirical analysis.
For the sake of developing a tractable empirical model we shall in the following introduce further assumptions. Recall that the utility 2 U depends on the (real) wage rate and non-pecuniary attributes of the job. However, for the purpose of this section it is sufficient to assume the following representation
v is the mean utility across agents, τ is a positive constant, ξ is a term that is supposed to capture the effect of unobservables (to the researcher) affecting the utility, and ω is a zero mean random term, with c.d.f. F, that is continuous, strictly increasing and has unit variance. However, ξ is perfectly certain to the individual agent. In contrast, the term ω is uncertain to the agent, and is thus perceived as a random variable to both the agent and the researcher. 3 Unfortunately, the researcher can not separate the two sources of randomness, ξ and .
τω Nevertheless, we need to use the representation (3) (or a similar one) to make our theoretical discussion precise and to facilitate the subsequent empirical specification in Section 4. The c.d.f. F, as well as τ, may be individual-specific, and we assume (with no loss of generality) that F has support with the upper bound equal to .
By straightforward integration by parts, it follows that
Since F is strictly increasing it follows by differentiation that ( ) H u * is strictly decreasing and convex for . 
2 2 max 0, max 0, max 0, .
The reason why we introduce τ in the notation is that we later wish to study the effect of changing the variance of t τω while keeping the distribution of ω fixed.
Hence, it follows that one can express V as
Note that the function ( ) H y neither depends on 2 v nor .
ξ Moreover, one can easily show that
It is of interest to consider the special case in which the agent is indifferent about job attributes, real wages are the same for all jobs and the only source of uncertainty is whether or not she will get a job offer. This case can be obtained by letting the degree of uncertainty, as represented by τ, decrease towards zero. Then (4) reduces to
, from which it follows that in the case without uncertainty about the value of the jobs, one obtains
In this case, where the agent's option value of being unemployed is given by Eq. (7), she will accept the first offer that arrives.
To clarify further the interpretation and intuition of the model we consider next the case whenτ → ∞ .
Then Eq. (5) implies that V tends towards infinity. The intuition is that since the left hand side of Eq.
this can only happen if V tends towards infinity. The interpretation is that when the job offer distribution F has unbounded support, then when τ increases, the chances of receiving a very valuable job offer increases, and therefore the value of searching will increase. Similarly, when 0 τ > and the search cost c decreases towards zero,
The intuition is that when it costs very little to search, the agent will find it worthwhile to search for a "long time" before accepting a job offer.
The fact that the utility V depends on λ through the transformation H makes the interpretation of Eq.
(6) less transparent. Recall also that in the standard search model where jobs are identified by jobspecific wages, the distribution of wages and the job arrival rate cannot be identified with data on durations and accepted wages unless strong and typically unjustified functional form assumptions are imposed, cf. Flinn and Heckman (1982, pp. 121−125) . Thus, empirical applications based on Eq. (6), or similar restrictions derived from search theory, are difficult and controversial because the functional form of F, or equivalently of the function H, are typically selected in an ad hoc way. It would therefore be desirable to express V in a way that does not depend on H. Surprisingly, this is in fact possible, although only in an approximate way. To this end, note first that one can express the probability that a job is acceptable as
where P  indicates that the probability is conditional on the agent's information. Moreover, by implicit differentiation of ( ( )) H H x x * = it follows that
By first order Taylor expansion of the function H(x) around the point / , c τλ we obtain that
This Taylor expansion is valid for positive x, but since ( ) H x is continuous at x = 0, Eq. (10) will also hold for x = 0. Hence, for x = 0, Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) imply that we can rewrite Eq. (6) as
is the arrival intensity of the acceptable jobs (conditional on the agent's information). In the general case the convexity of H implies by well known results that
which implies that the right hand side of Eq. (11) is an upper bound of V.
The relation obtained in Eq. (11) is the main theoretical result of this section. The intuition of the relation is as follows: First, since job offers arrive according to a Bernoulli process, with parameter λ , then also the acceptable job offers arrive according to a Bernoulli process. This is quite intuitive. 4 This implies that the expected length of time until the next acceptable job arrival equals 1/ . q * Consequently, / c q * is the expected search cost (or disutility) until an acceptable job offer arrives.
Thus V is equal to the utility of search with no search costs (equal to the utility of being employed) minus the expected cost of searching until an acceptable job offer arrives. Eventual unemployment benefits enter this model through c. 5 To the best of our knowledge, Eq. (11) does not seem to have appeared previously in the literature.
In contrast to Eq. (6), Eq. (11) depends on the business cycle fluctuations through an observable term , q * and in addition, V is linear as a function of * 1/ ; q that is, no nonlinear transformation is involved.
The structure of the utility of search given in Eq. (11) is intuitive because it corresponds to a reasonable assumption about search behavior of a bounded rational agent who is able to form expectations about search costs, the expected value of arriving jobs given information about the arrival rate of acceptable jobs and the distribution of the random component of the job-specific utilities. The role of the search theoretic development above is two-fold: First, it serves to demonstrate that a version of the search theoretic approach can be adapted and modified to obtain an empirical tractable version, in contrast to the standard approach that in our context will depend too heavily on unobservable terms. Second, the approximation in Eq. (11) is close if / c τλ is small, but it may be crude if this is not the case, which means that the theoretical support for Eq. (11) may be weak if / c τλ is not small. Nevertheless, since our decision rule in Eq. (11) appears quite plausible because it has such a clear and intuitive interpretation, we feel confident to base our empirical analysis on this relation.
The discouraged worker effect
In this section we propose a formal definition of the discouraged worker effect. First, we need to define a "reference" regime with "low" unemployment. As reference regime, we choose a setting in which , λ = ∞ which means that the worker receives job offers instantly upon search. This setting implies that there will be no unemployment. Although this evidently is an idealized setting, which will never occur in practice, we nevertheless believe that it serves as a natural reference case. Since λ = ∞ implies that / 0, c λ = with corresponding value of search equal to (0), V we immediately obtain that a worker is discouraged when When taking into account the approximation given in Eq. (11) the condition for being discouraged, as given in Eq. (12), becomes
Empirical specification
We shall now discuss how we can use the results obtained above to formulate an empirical model for individuals' assignment to the following 3 states: "Out of the labor force" (state 0), "Unemployed" (state 1), and "Employed" (state 2). Although we are primarily interested in a model for the probability of supplying labor (being in the labor force), we need to specify a complete model for the 3 states above for the purpose of efficient use of the information available in the data. Recall that in the treatment above, we only considered uncertainty from the perspective of the individual agent. In contrast, when specifying the empirical model, we need in addition to take into account variables that are known by the individual agent, but unobserved by the econometrician (unobservables).
Let W denote the real wage that corresponds to the job offer with utility 2 U and assume that
where ζ is a term that represents the value of non-pecuniary aspects of the job offer. The term ζ may vary across agents due to heterogeneity in agents' preferences. We call exp( ) W ζ the modified wage.
The modified wage takes into account that non-pecuniary aspects also matter to the agents. Thus, an attractive job with respect to non-pecuniary aspects corresponds to a high value of .
ζ Hence, the agent may accept this job even if the wage rate is low as long as the modified wage is high.
In our data we only observe the current wage of those who work, that is, the wage conditional on acceptable job offers. Therefore, we need to specify a (real) wage equation and an estimation procedure for recovering the unconditional distribution of the real wage. To this end we assume that
where X consists of length of schooling, experience, experience squared and a variable representing regional population density, and η is a zero mean random variable that is independent of X and has variance 2 .
σ Experience is defined as age minus schooling (number of years) minus school start.
Here, we allow the intercept 0 Furthermore, assume that
where 0 v is a systematic term that depends on observed individual characteristics, whereas 0 ε is a random error term that is supposed to account for the effect of unobservables. In the following, we will assume that ( ) 0 2 , θε θε are jointly standard extreme value distributed (see Appendix C) and
serially independent, where θ is a suitable positive parameter whose role is to standardize the standard deviations of , 0, 2.
γ where Z is a vector of variables consisting of one, age, age squared, the logarithm of real nonlabor income, and three variables representing the number of children with age less than 3 years, number of children with age between 4 and 6 and number of children with age above 6 in the household. The real nonlabor income variable is the husband's income. Since labor supply decisions of wife and husband are interdependent this raises the question to what extent this variable is endogenous. To deal with interdependent household labor supply properly requires a model for joint labor supply of wife and husband, which will, however, be beyond the scope of this paper. Note furthermore that length of schooling is not included in Z. This is consistent with the standard labor supply literature. Although there are grounds for including length of schooling in Z this would lead to serious identification problems. 6
Without loss of generality we can normalize such that 2 ε has the same mean as 0 . ε The assumptions above and the theory of discrete choice imply that the probability of being in the labor force equals
and where we have replaced 1/q by 1/ 1. q − 7 Since Z γ contains an intercept this substitution represents no loss of generality. Although the choice probability follows from well known results (see for example McFadden, 1984) , we provide a proof in Appendix C to make the paper selfcontained. There we also demonstrate that there is no loss of generality in assuming that the error terms 0 ε and 2 ε are independent.
To complete the empirical specification we need a model of the probability q, i.e., the probability of facing an acceptable job given that the individual searches. We are unfortunately not able to give a structural specification of q that explicitly accounts for the fact that q depends on both preferences and on the job arrival rate. Instead we assume the following reduced form representation
where B is a vector consisting of length of schooling, experience, experience squared, number of children in three age groups, logarithm of real nonlabor income, and time dummies. This specification is sufficient for the purpose of this paper, since the role of q is to serve as an instrument variable that enables us to predict the probability of getting unemployed for subgroups defined by the vector . B
Note that 1 q − corresponds to the probability of getting unemployed for agents with characteristics . B
It is easily realized that there is no identification problem here because our data set contains information about which of the three states "out of the labor force", "unemployed" and "employed", the agent occupies at time t. The relation in (20) can therefore be identified from the subsample of persons who are in the labor force (i.e., employed or unemployed). Specifically, the dependent variable that is relevant for estimating (20) is equal to one if the agent is employed and zero if the agent is unemployed. However, since all the individual covariates represented by X and Z also enter the vector B in q, identification is achieved because of B contain time dependent dummy variables representing business cycle variations. 8 We have estimated the model by a simultaneous quasi-maximum likelihood procedure, to be discussed in Section 6. Alternatively, one could estimate the model in several stages. By this we mean that q is estimated in a first stage, and that we use the estimated value as an independent variable together with the other explanatory variables, to estimate the probability of being in the labor force in a second stage, given by (19). This requires that the (real) wage equation has been estimated first. In the estimation of the wage equation one faces a potential selection bias problem. In Appendix C it is demonstrated that one can use log P − as an additional regressor to control for selection bias in the (real) wage equation. Hence, a reduced form specification of (19) Finally, let us consider the implication for the prediction of the discouraged worker effect. When 1, q = we have "full" employment. From (19) we thus get that the probability of being discouraged
Data
The data were obtained by merging the Labor Force Survey (LFS) 1988-2008 and three different register data sets-the Tax Register for personal tax payers 1988-1992, the Tax Return Register 1993-2008, and the National Education database-with additional information about incomes, family composition, children, and education. 9 Information about whether the person lives in a densely populated area is also linked to the dataset. The classification in the LFS is based on answers to a broad range of questions. Persons are asked about their attachment to the labor market during a particular week. For a person to be defined as unemployed, she must not be employed in the survey week, she must have been seeking work actively during the preceding four weeks, and she must wish to return to work within the next two weeks.
Information about actual and formal working times in a worker's main job, as well as in a possible second job, and background variables such as demographic characteristics and occupation are also included in the LFS. Conditional on labor market participation, respondents are asked whether they consider themselves as self-employed or as employees. Based on this information, we have excluded self-employed women in the empirical analysis. Working time is measured as formal hours of work on an annual basis in both the main and possible second job. If this information is missing and the respondent is participating in the labor market, information about actual working time is used. The actual sample we use is a subset of the LFS and consists of independent cross-sections for all years from 1988 (second quarter) to 2008 (fourth quarter). A woman in the sample is observed in one quarter only.
In order to expand the analysis period of this study, we use data (incomes, demographic The sample is further reduced by including only married or cohabiting females ranging in age between 25 and 60 years. The motivation for the age restriction is that education is an important activity for women under 25 years of age, and that for those older than 60 years, early retirement is rather fre-quent. 10 Married women with zero nonlabor income are also excluded from the sample. Moreover, married women with real nonlabor income higher than one million NOK in real terms are also excluded. This leaves us with a final sample for all years of 57,440 females used in the estimation of the model. The average proportion of women outside the labor force is 12.1 percent (6,953 females), the average unemployment rate is 2.1 percent (1,202 females), and the average employment rate is 85.8 percent (49,285 females). In the estimation we have removed real wage observations where either the real wages are below the 3 rd percentile or above the 99 th percentile. However, we have not removed the corresponding women with these wages. As a result, the set of observations that enter the part of the loglikelihood function that concerns real wages is reduced from 49,285 to 47,329 employed women.
Two characteristics are evident in the sample: There has been an upward trend in female labor market participation over the period, and the unemployment share shows business cycle fluctuations over the years covered by the sample. In Appendix D, Table D1 , we report the share of total number of persons in different labor market states for each year in the time span 1988-2008. Furthermore, in Table D2 of that Appendix we report summary statistics on an annual basis for the variables used in our econometric analysis. Table 1 reports, as an example, a segment of these two extensive tables corresponding to 1995. 10 Norway has an early retirement program for workers. It was introduced for the first time in 1988, originally only for 66 years old workers working in firms that were participating in the program. Today the program covers most workers aged 62−66 years.
Estimation and empirical results
In this section we report estimation procedures and estimation results. Recall that the individual at any time is in one of the 3 states "Out of the labor force" (state 0), "Unemployed" (state 1) and
"Employed" (state 2). To this end it is convenient to introduce individual-and time indexation. Let ijt P * be the probability that individual i is in state j in period t. Clearly, 2 ,
In Appendix C we demonstrate that the (real) wage equation for woman i at time t who works can be written as
where ρ is a positive parameter and the random error term * it η has zero mean (conditional on working and given the regressors 
 
Although all the parameters of the model are estimated simultaneously, we find it convenient to present the results in different tables. The estimates of the parameters in the (real) wage equation and in q it are reported in Table A1 and Table A2 in Appendix A, respectively, whereas the results for the structural parameters (of the participation probability) are presented in Table 2 . From Table A1 , we observe that the sample selection variable has an insignificant effect. The effects of schooling and experience are consistent with findings in previous analyses using Norwegian data (see, for example, Dagsvik and Strøm, 2006) . In agreement with our a priori belief we find, ceteris paribus, that females living in densely populated areas have higher expected real wage rates than females living in sparsely populated areas.
Recall that since
q depends on the variables that enter λ , V and 0 U . According to the results in Table A2 , both length of schooling and (potential) work experience have a positive effect on the probability of getting an acceptable job, conditional on search. The presence of children reduces this probability. This may be because utility of nonparticipation increases with the number of children. This, in turn, implies that it is less likely that a woman with children will decide that an arriving job is acceptable compared to a woman with no children. In addition, we find that an increase in (real) nonlabor income increases the probability of finding a job conditional on search. If labor market skills and qualifications are positively correlated among partners, we expect to find high correlation between the real nonlabor income of the female and her qualifications in the labor market In this case we would expect that the job arrival rate λ (which is a component of q) may be correlated with real nonlabor income. 11 100x(1-q) 11 From the outset we included the dummy for densely populated area in the expression for q. However, since the estimated coefficient attached to this variable was highly insignificant it was dropped in the final estimation. As a sensitivity check we have also estimated the complete model when the 21 annual dummies are replaced by 83 quarterly dummies. Whereas the loglikelihood value in the maintained model is 9,595.77, the log-likelihood value of this alternative model is 9,613.14. Given the number of degrees of freedom gained, this may be interpreted as support for the maintained model. The estimates of the other parameters in the model do not vary substantially between these two specifications.
In Table 2 , we report, for the sake of comparison, both the estimation results of the structural model and the results of a constrained model where it is assumed a priori that the discouraged worker effect does not enter the model. Apart from a significant loss of explanatory power, the most striking feature is the higher coefficient associated with the predicted log real wage rate, and the reduced coefficient (in absolute value) associated with log real nonlabor income. This means that when we ignore the discouraged worker effect, we overestimate the effects of changes in wages on participation, whereas the effects of changes in nonlabor income are underestimated. All the estimates in Table 2 related to the maintained model have the a priori expected signs. Apart from the estimate of the coefficient attached to the first order term of age, they are all significant. 12 Utilizing the parameter estimates in Table A2 we may predict the probability of being unemployed for each woman in the sample. In Figure 1 we graph the annual mean of 100(1-q), i.e., the annual mean of perceived probabilities of getting unemployed given in percent. As can be seen from Figure 1 , this variable shows business cycle variation over time which is of vital importance from an empirical point of view when estimating the discouraged worker effect. Dagsvik, Kornstad, and Skjerpen (2006) based on a similar model, and a sample of microdata from 1988 to 2002 produced somewhat different empirical results. This is due to different specification of the variables representing the number of children in different age groups and the fact that the new data set covering the period from 1988 to 2008 covers additional major business cycle variations.
Elasticities and various model predictions
We will now investigate some key properties of the estimated structural model. In Table 3, To assess the magnitude of the discouraged worker effect, we have in the sixth column of Table 3 predicted the mean of P(1)-P(q) in different time periods. Furthermore, we have in the eight column of Table 3 predicted the share of women outside the work force that are discouraged workers. This share is computed as the mean (over women in the respective time periods) of the predicted ratios [P(1)-P(q)]/ [1-P(q) ]. Recall that P(1) is a "reference" case that corresponds to an ideal situation in which the agent perceives with perfect certainty that she will get an acceptable job if she 13 Our primary reason for reporting figures for three years periods is to reduce the sampling uncertainty such that we may obtain more precise estimates of the share of discouraged workers reported in the third last column of Table 3. decides to search, whereas the second probability is the one that follows from the maintained model.
As seen from the last row of the table, the global predicted mean increases by about 0.05, which implies that, on average, about one third of those outside the labor force are discouraged as reported in the third last column of Table 3 . The share shows some variation through the periods.
In the column of Table 3 next to the last, we have simulated labor supply behavior in the counterfactual case with real wage rates generated by the wage equation with the intercept as in 1988.
As a consequence, the increase in labor force participation from 1988−1990 to 2006−2008 reduces to about 5 percentage points. Most of this increase in labor force participation is due to increased education levels, increasing real wage levels and reduced unemployment during the sample period considered in this analysis.
Next, consider elasticities, which are characterized by being invariant to the arbitrary choice of units of measurement in both variables. In this section, we calculate a different type of elasticities. We use so-called quasi-elasticities (see Cramer, 2001, p. 8) . The motivation for this is that "probability" is itself a relative concept and its scale is not arbitrary. Using a nickname we refer to this as an unemployment elasticity. As both P and (1-q) are probabilities and hence dimensionless, we find it consistent with Cramer's intuition to label the derivatives in Eqs. (23) -(28) quasi-elasticities.
Furthermore, we define the quasi-elasticities of the discouraged worker effect with respect to the same three variables as
(1 )
(1) ( ) . (1 ) (1 )
In columns 2−4 in Table 4 , we report for selected years the annual mean of the quasi-wage ( Table 3 , we note that the mean predicted labor force participation rate is 0.80 in 1988 and 0.96 in 2008. If we counterfactually assume a 5 percent universally increase in the real wage rate in 1988, the mean predicted participation rate would have increased to 0.83.
Correspondingly, a 10 percent universal increase in real nonlabor income would have lowered the mean predicted participation rate by 0.004. Finally, if all the predicted perceived unemployment rates had been increased by 0.05, the mean predicted labor participation probability would have decreased to 0.59. If we make the same type of calculations for 2008, the changes in the mean predicted participation probabilities in the three counterfactual situations would have been about 0.008, -0.001, and -0.040, respectively. Over the time span considered in this analysis, there is a positive trend in female labor participation, and this leads to a negative trend in the mean quasi-wage elasticity over time. The mean quasi-nonlabor income elasticity is rather small in magnitude. The quasiunemployment elasticity, which picks up the discouraged worker effect, shows business cycle variation over time. Ceteris paribus, the quasi-unemployment elasticity will become higher as the perceived probability of being unemployed given search efforts becomes higher. One advantage of using microdata in structural analysis is that it allows the researcher to assess the importance of population heterogeneity when partial effects from changes in exogenous variables are considered. In Table 5 , we report simulations of quasi-elasticities related to real wage, real nonlabor income, and the probability of getting unemployed for 31 different groups of females. In addition to the quasi-elasticities of participation defined in (23)-(25), we also report elasticities of the discouraged worker effect given by (26) and (27) (two last columns), similarily to what we did in Table 4 . 17 The cases differ with respect to combinations of real wage rate (100 and 200 NOK in constant 1998prices), real nonlabor income (100,000 and 300,000 NOK), age (30 and 45 years), the number of children in different age groups (0−3, 4−6 and 7−18 years) and the probability of getting an acceptable job, given search (q equal to 0.92, 0.97, and 1, respectively). The values for age, number of children in different age groups and q are chosen in order to embrace the possible variation in these variables. A level of real wages of 100 NOK corresponds to the lower wage rate deciles in Norway. A probability of getting a job, given search, equal to 0.97 is close to the situation in Norway today, whereas the probability 0.92 is considered to be a rather extreme case in Norway, but not in many other European countries. 
Participation probabilities
As seen from formulae (23)-(28), the levels of the participation probabilities have a major impact on the value of the quasi-elasticities. Specifically, we note that an increase in the probability of labor market participation decreases the absolute value of the quasi-elasticities in most cases.
Labor market participation rates (column for P(q), Table 5 ) and the elasticities are strongly influenced by the real wage rate, and the higher the real wage rate is, the higher is the participation rate. For instance, if we consider a 30 years old woman, with one child aged 0−3 years, real nonlabor income equal to 100,000 NOK and q=0.97 (Case 8 and Case 17), an increase in the real wage rate from 100 NOK to 200 NOK leads to an increase in the predicted probability of labor force participation from 0.90 to 0.99.
With real wages at 100 or 200 NOK, the probability of labor force participation varies significantly across different age groups and different probabilities of getting an acceptable job, given search. For instance, the participation rate of a female with real wage rate 100 NOK, real nonlabor income 300,000 NOK, two children aged 4−6 years, one child aged 7−18 years and q=0.97 is reduced by 22 percentage points, from 0.78 to 0.56, when her age increases from 30 to 45 years (Case 15 and Case 27).
The number of children and the age of each of them also have a noticeable effect on the participation rate. While the participation rate of a 30 year old female with real wage rate 100 NOK, real nonlabor income 100,000 NOK and zero children is 0.90 when q=0.92 (Case 1), the participation rate is only 0.75 when the female, ceteris paribus, has one child aged 0−3 years (Case 7). The older the child is, the lower is the effect on the participation rate. For instance, if the child is 4−6 years, the participation rate is 0.81 (Case 4). On the other hand, if the mother has more children, two children aged 4−6 years and one child 7−18 years, her preferences for staying out of the labor force increases, and the participation rate is only 0.62 (Case 10).
Quasi-elasticities of participation probability
From 
Quasi-elasticities of the discouraged worker effect
The two last columns in Table 5 show the responses in the discouraged worker effect with respect to changes in the real wage rate and in real nonlabor income. The quasi-nonlabor income elasticity ( 4
is positive, but rather small for most combinations of real wages, ages, real nonlabor income, number of children in the three age groups and the probability of getting an acceptable job, given search. In contrast, the quasi-wage elasticity of the discouraged worker effect ( D EW E ) is negative, and it shows much more variation. It is reduced by an increase in the real wage rate, see for instance Case 7 and Case 8 versus Case 16 and Case 17. It is also typically reduced by an increase in the probability of getting an acceptable job. As for the participation wage elasticity, the number of children and the age of each of them are of importance for the discouraged worker wage elasticity, cf. for instance Case 1 and Case 2; Case 4 and Case 5; Case 7 and Case 8; and Case 10 and Case 11. The wage elasticity of the discouraged worker effect is lower for older females than for younger ones.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a simple search theoretic framework for rationalizing the discouraged worker effect, namely that labor force participation depends negatively on unemployment. In particular, we have demonstrated that our theory yields an explicit characterization of the value of searching for work as a function of the distribution of the utility of working and the arrival rate of acceptable job offers. Based on this framework, we have specified an empirical model for the probability that a person is out of the labor force, unemployed, or employed in a given period. The estimation results show that the model explains the data very well without introducing time dummies for the utility of being out of the labor force. In other words, according to our model the increase in labor market participation from 1988 to 2008 is mainly due to the increase in the real wage.
Due to the fact that there is little variation in the real wage rate apart from an increasing trend effect we cannot rule out that this trend in the real wage rate captures a possible unobserved drift in preferences for labor market participation. 
Appendix A: Further estimation results

Appendix B: Proof of the property that the number of acceptable jobs follows a Bernoulli process
By assumption the job offers arrive according to a Poisson process with arrival intensity .
λ Moreover, the utilities of the respective jobs are independent i.i.d. random variables. Let 2 ( ).
be the number of acceptable jobs. Given N job offers, the probability that x out of them are acceptable is Binomially distributed. Also within an interval (0, T), (say), N is Binomially distributed. Hence ( | )
( 1 ) ,
. n T ≤ Consequently, the probability mass of X is given by
which by Newton's Binomial formula, Berck and Sydsaeter (1999, Eq. (8.28) ), reduces to
The last expression above shows that the number of acceptable jobs is a Bernoulli process, such that the number of acceptable offers that arrives in (0, T) is Binomially distributed with parameter . 
The first part of Lemma 1, (C.2), is well known; see for example McFadden (1984) . For the readers' convenience, the proof is given below.
Proof:
Under the distributional assumption in (C.1), it follows that 
which completes the proof.
Correction for selectivity bias
We shall now discuss a particular version of Heckman's method, which is similar to Heckman (1979) .
To this end, we need to calculate 2 ( | , E η ε the individual works). We assume that
where η * is a zero mean random variable that is independent of 2 ε and 0 ε , and ρ is an unknown parameter. 
We realize that we can set 1 μ = in the expression in (C.9) without loss of generality. Recall that the expectation of a stochastic variable that follows the type III extreme value distribution
where we recall that P is the probability of being in the labor force. As a result of (C.10) and
Hence, the regression model to be estimated on our self-selected sample is given by Consider finally the conditional variance of η given that the individual works. Note that it follows from (C.9) that the variance of the conditional distribution of 2 , θε given that the individual works, is equal to the unconditional variance (which is equal to π 2 /6). Moreover, since η * is independent of the error terms of the decision rule that governs the labor force participation entrance, we obtain 
Appendix D: Supplementary calculations
This appendix provides supplementary calculations (Table D1-Table D5 ) to the ones presented in the main part of this paper as well as 2 figures. We now explain how these additional calculations are related to the tables in the main part of the paper. Note that the numbering of the tables in the appendix begins with a capital letter referring to appendix number, while the tables in the main part of the paper are numbered consecutively.
In Table D1 we report the share of persons outside the labor force, the share of unemployed persons and the share of employed persons for all years from 1988 to 2008. Note that these shares add identically to one. In Table 1 we report the share of employed and unemployed persons for 1995 only.
In Table D2 we report summary statistics for a selection of variables for the years 1988 to 2008, whereas the five last rows of Table 1 contain summary statistics for 1995. Table D3 also report estimates based on the sub-sample period 1988−2002.
In Table D4 we report mean quasi-elasticities related to participation P(q) and the discouraged worker effect P(1)-P(q) for all years in the time span 1988 to 2008, whereas Table 4 contains such   information for the years 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2008. In Table 5 we report the predicted probability of labor force participation and quasi-elasticities related to participation and the discouraged worker effect for 31 groups of women. Totally in Table D5 we consider 117 cases. Not all cases in Table 5 are included in Table D5 . Instead, Table D5 shows the effects of larger variations in the covariates (in particular the number of children in different age intervals).
The estimated parameters of the wage equation are reported in Table A1 . Here we display two figures, Figure D1 and Figure D2 , which are based on the residuals of the wage equation, cf. * it η in the unnumbered equation at the beginning of Section 6 in the main part of the paper. 
Tables
